ABSTRACT Stimulating competition is one of the main topics in most health care reform debates, and it has been a central issue in the Affordable Care Act (ACA), USA, since 2009. The goal of this paper is to use complex network methods to study dynamic and structure of competition under ACA and its evolution over time since its beginning until 2017. Using publicly available data, we construct a bipartite network of counties and insurance providers, create associated weighted single-mode networks, and analyze the evolution of network parameters that are related to competition and potential collusion in complex networks. These parameters have been previously tied to the dynamics of collaboration and competition in earlier theoretical works. We argue that three parameters (network modularity, and the mean and skewness of eigenvector centrality) are appropriate indicators of the overall competition in the insurance market. Based on these parameters, we show that the level of systemic competition among insurers as a function of time is an inverse U-shape trend, and that competition has returned back to what it was at the very beginning of ACA, indicating an undesirable resilience in the national health care system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spurring more competition among health insurance companies has been one of the central goals in most proposals and plans offered over the past decades for revamping the US health care system. In this spirit, and during the early debates around the Affordable Care Act (ACA, aka ObamaCare), the advocates of the law were projecting that it would increase competition among insurers. However, recent evidence shows that though competition initially improved the early trend has recently met with a marked reversal. This lack of sufficient competition is held to be responsible for some of the problems in the ACA, especially when a surge in average premium prices is considered.
Problems with insurance market competitions are evident by looking at some aggregate statistics: As of 2017, 17% of Americans eligible for ACA have access to only one insurance provider, up from merely 2% in the previous year. As Figure 1 suggests, while there has been a natural flow of companies entering and leaving the ACA market, there is a sharp decline in the number of participating companies between 2016 to 2017, bringing the total number to 236-down from its peak of 333 in 2015. In his widely publicized paper in 2016 in JAMA, President Barack Obama listed insurance competition as one of the areas where ACA needed significant improvements in coming years [1] . Moreover, it is not entirely clear that boosting competition would always have the intended desired impacts on the insurance market, especially when it comes to lowering average insurance premiums, since splitting the market among various players might negatively impact their bargaining position in negotiating rates with providers [2] .
Despite the central importance of competition in health care reforms in general, and in the assessment of ACA in particular, there have been few studies that take a deeper look at the structure and dynamics of insurance market competition. Much of the existing measures of competition are based on aggregate numbers, often the number of providers at national or state level. While these aggregate measures provide a proxy for the state of competition, they do not help us understand the structure of competition among individual 1 There are fewer carriers participating across all carrier types in 2017, with national carriers declining most significantly [3] .
insurers, and in various geographic locations. This is particularly crucial because of the complex nature of competition in the health care, which depends on the complex interactions between insurers and other players in concentrated oligopolistic health care markets [4] . Modeling such local dynamics can help us understand the drivers of evolution in market competition, which in turn can be used by policy makers for holistic decision making. This paper takes a complex network approach towards the insurance market under the ACA to study a more refined structure of competition in the insurance market and its evolution over time till 2017. For each set of data, released on healthcare.gov [5] from 2013 until April 2017, we construct a bipartite network of counties and insurance providers, create associated weighted mono-partite networks, and analyze the evolution of network parameters that are related to competition and potential collusion in complex networks. These parameters have been previously tied to the dynamics of collaboration and competition in earlier theoretical works. We demonstrate that three parameters, namely network modularity, and mean and skewness of eigenvector centrality are good predictors of the overall competition in the insurance market. Furthermore, we visualize the structure of the insurance market using competition network among insurance providers and its evolution over time. We will argue that useful information about dynamics of competition can be inferred from such visualizations.
Briefly, we show that the temporal evolution of competition since the beginning of ACA has not been uniform, rather it has experienced an inverted U-Shape, with a peak at 2015. The key network measures also show that the overall level of market competition in 2017 is back to its pre-ACA level in 2013, once the network measures are calculated for weighted networks. This is particularly interesting as it suggests an inherent and undesirable resilience in the insurance market that has brought back the network to its original state, three years after the external shock that was introduced by the ACA to the system. While complex networks have been frequently used to study various aspects of competition and the closely related concept of collaboration as well, to the best of our knowledge this paper is the first study that uses complex network methods to analyze the Affordable Care Act and its competition.
Before we proceed to the main part of the paper, it is worth mentioning that the Affordable Care Act market is quickly changing, with several players leaving (and in some cases still entering) the market every month. As a result, it is expected that by the time this paper is in press, several of the underlying network structures would have changed relative to data analyzed here. However, the network construction method, relevant network measures suggested in this work, and most of the general conclusions are expected to remain relevant, even after the market structure changes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we provide a review of related literature. Next, In Section III, 1 Blues: a Blue Cross Blue Shield payor, includes Anthem, HCSC, Regence ; Consumer-operated-and-oriented plan (CO-OP): a recipient of federal CO-OP grant funding that was not a commercial payer before 2014; Medicaid: a carrier that offered only Medicaid insurance in the past, includes Molina and Centene, along with regional/local Medicaid carriers; National: a commercial payor with a presence in more than four states that has filed on exchanges (specifically, Aetna/Coventry, Assurant, Cigna, Humana, UnitedHealthcare) ; Provider: a carrier that also operates as a provider/health system ; Regional/local: a commercial payor with a presence in four or fewer states (most often, just one state) that has filed on the exchanges.
we describe the process of gathering and preparing data set for this study, explain how we construct bipartite and associated mono-partite networks, and then visualize the structural evolution of the insurance competition network.
In Section IV, we analyze evolution of structural features of the insurance competition network and discuss how they help predict the state of global competition in the marketplace. Finally, in Section V, we conclude and provide directions for future research.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
We do not intend to offer a comprehensive literature review for this paper. However, we provide a brief description of three relevant works: The first two, point to some key aspects of competition in health care insurance market in general, and insurers competition under ACA in particular. The last one discusses the literature that links market and systemic competition to the structure of complex networks.
Health Care Competition: Competition in health care has been a subject of a large number of previous studies by health economists; however, most of these studies have focused on competition among health care providers, hospitals and physicians, but competition in the insurance market has received little attention until recently. This is because gaining access to relevant data, especially those with geographical resolution higher than state-level, has been difficult [6] . Moreover the structure of the competition in insurance market has been complex, because the role of that employees who stand between insurers and consumers for much of the market in the United States. In some recent cases where these obstacles were overcome, a number of empirical studies have been conducted in investigating the impact of competition on the premium prices and on demand elasticity in health insurance market [4] , [7] . For example, based on available data in the pre-ACA insurance market, [8] finds that lower competition has resulted in higher premiums and health care insurers possess and exercise powerful market positions in an increasing number of geographic markets. We direct the interested reader to [6] for an in-depth review of the pre-ACA literature related to health care competition in general, including a review of available research on insurance market competition.
Competition under Affordable Care Act: Competition has been one of the central issues in the ACA debate since its inception. It is worth mentioning that the two key research obstacles, described by [6] , do not apply directly to studying insurers competition under Affordable Care Act. First, data is openly available for ACA markets compared to traditional pre-ACA private market since description of plans and premium prices are regularly released at the county level, which we will describe in the next section. Moreover, the direct nature of the market removes some of the complexity related to the role of employees who act as intermediary and negotiator in employee-based insurance market. Consequently, since 2014, there have been a number of studies on the competition in ACA and its impact on premium prices at the national or state level [9] - [12] . Two recent studies, for example, conclude that higher competition has resulted in both lower premiums as well as lower federal payments for premium subsidies [13] , [14] .
Competition in Economic Networks: Dynamics of competition on networks have been studied in a variety of economic and organizational contexts [15] - [17] . Even though the notion of competition in networks have received some attention by researchers in complexity sciences [18] , [19] , cooperation, as a closely related concept has received much more attention in the literature of complex systems since the seminal work of Axelrod and Hamilton [20] . One of the key questions in this literature has been identifying network structural determinants of dynamics of cooperation and competition. For example, [21] shows that network modularity has the closest connection to the level of cooperation in a complex network when the underlying interaction of participants follows the relatively competitive prisoners' dilemma game.
Besides network modularity, various measures of network centrality have also been considered as determinants of relative status, power, and their distribution in complex networks. While several different measures for centrality are used depending on the context and application, [22] argues that eigenvector centrality is this most appropriate measure of power and status in a network compared to other measures of centrality based on degree, betweenness or closeness. Eigenvector centrality and its distribution have also been shown to be a proper measure of competition in many competing networks [23] . In this paper, we use these two measures, namely network modularity and eigenvector centrality as systemic indicators of competition.
III. DATA AND MODEL
In this section, we first explain the process of gathering and preparing the required data. Then we discuss how bipartite networks are constructed using these data, and how those networks are used to perform analysis related to market competition.
A. DATA SET
In this study, we use data publicly available on healthcare.gov [5] (which we will refer to as HGOV) that covers individual and family health plans available in states where the federal government is operating the marketplace from the earliest days of the ACA launch (October 2013). States that are not presented in the data run their own marketplaces and we do not consider them for this study, although we acknowledge that this creates a limitation in the current work. Plan data for each year are available as a single table which is updated throughout the year. Each row in the table represents a plan offered by a provider in a county along with premium, or cost data.
We use HGOV data to construct the insurance plan competition network. To do so, we first obtained all individual insurance exchange plan data for period October 2013 through April 2017. These data contain plan costs by county and FIGURE 2. Sample visualization of insurer to county health care insurance plan bipartite network. The figure is a insurer-to-county bipartite graph visualization (using [26] ) of the local health care market nearest to the Optima insurer in the first year of ACA. Node color and symbols are shown on the figure, circle nodes are colored based the state in which the county resides and circle area is proportional to the market opportunity in the county (population × median income). Links between insurer and county are colored based on the median cost of plans provided to the connected county. Lightly weighted gray links are formed between adjacent counties.
insurer for all plans available in the exchange. To account for plans that vary premium and deductible amounts we calculate cost for each plan based on the sum of its annual deductible and annual premiums for a 27-year-old single individual, which we selected since the cost for this type of customer is available in all time periods we consider in this work. We then align the naming of HGOV counties with standard names found in the U.S. Census [24] , since the county names in HGOV change over time. We also merge the multitude of regional insurer variants (e.g., BlueCrossandBlueShieldofNebraska and BlueCrossandBlueShieldofIllinois are mapped to the name BlueCross). Since a connected graph is necessary for our analysis, we remove counties that are disconnected from the largest component of a spatial graph formed by using the U.S. Census county adjacency list [25] of counties that are common to all time periods. After handling missing data, what remains is a set of 1542 counties (more than half of all U.S. Counties) that are present in all time periods.
B. BIPARTITE NETWORK ANALYSIS
We perform our network analysis of market competition in two steps. First we construct a bipartite network and use the result mainly for some dynamic visualizations and simple high-level analysis. In the next step, we convert the two-mode network to a single-mode network, which makes the base for most of the dynamic analysis.
After pre-processing the HGOV data and adjusting county names, we create bipartite (two-mode) networks of insurers and counties where insurance providers and counties constitute each of the two modes. The networks span 21 states in the federal exchange, where an edge is present between county and insurer if a plan is offered by an insurer to a 27-year-old adult in the target county. These networks offer substantial flexibility for visualization since both local and global competition networks can be extracted and demonstrated. Here, we show a sample visualization in Figure 2 , that uses the 2014 data to show a small bipartite sub-graph of competitors and targeted counties surrounding Optima. Furthermore, we summarize changes in the networks over time through trending the degree distribution of the insurercounty bipartite network. Figure 3 shows degree distribution of the bipartite graph for nodes that represent counties in three time periods i.e., 2013-09-30, 2015-12-12, and 2017-04-05, during the operation of the health care marketplace. In 2013-09-30 and 2017-05-12, more than 27% of all counties have only one insurer offering plans. However, in 2015-12-12, the number of counties with only one insurer is less than 15% and there are at least two insurers participating in the majority of counties. It is worth noting that although we used the two-mode network to create these plots, they do not show any structural measure of competition and the results are similar to previous studies that based competition on the number of available plans per county. We describe systemic measures of competition in the next section.
C. STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE COMPETITION NETWORK
Although some methods have been suggested to calculate and interpret various network measures for bipartite networks [27] , [28] , network level parameters related to competition have been mostly calculated and used for single-mode networks in the literature. As a result, we focus the rest of our analysis on single-mode networks and their dynamic analysis. Two single-mode networks can be generated from the original bipartite network. For this paper, however, we only focus on the one that represents insurer-to-insurer connections. We acknowledge that this study will be more complete once the network of counties are also included in the analysis.
We performed a one-mode insurer projection of the insurer-to-county two-mode network. The result is a nondirected, weighted insurer-to-insurer network, where the weights are based on the quantity of counties in which the insurers interact. If two insurers do not provide plans to any counties in common then there will be no edge (link) between them, whereas insurers that provide plans to many common counties will share a highly weighted edge. We will refer to this projection as the competition network.
Before we proceed further to analysis of the competition network, we look at the evolution of this network during the course of ACA execution. Figure 4 shows the evolution of insurance market structure for three representative time points since the initial roll-out of the federal insurance exchange.
Panel (A) and (B) in Figure 4 show the insurance market structure at roll-out (2013-09-30) compared to the end of 2015. Moving counterclockwise from zero degrees in Figure 4 panel (A), initially the market was roughly divided in half between the community of insurers (determined by random walk [29] ) surrounding Blue Cross (blue nodes in Figure 4 ) and the other groups. The next largest group of insurers is 1/4 the size of the Blue Cross group. Finally, the least connected (quadrant four of Figure 4 panel (A) ) insurer groups merely connect internally within their group and also with Blue Cross itself.
The structure of the insurance market network by the end of 2015 (Figure 4 panel (B) ) is significantly different than the starting network. First, few insurers have left the market (7 magenta-labeled nodes in panel (A)) compared to new [30] ). In both panels nodes are laid out such that the most connected insurer (BlueCross in both panels) is placed in the center and the other insurers are placed in a surrounding circle. Nodes in the circle are grouped within their community (distinguished by color), determined by a random walk method [29] , and each community is ordered by their weighted degree of connection (the most connected community is placed first at the 0 • position and lower relative degree insurers within each community are placed in order, counterclockwise). Insurers that leave the market between the first period and the final period are highlighted in the first period by a magenta colored label. Relationships between insurers (counties in which insurers compete) that are present in the first period but missing in the final are shown as red links in the first period. New relationships between insurers are shown as blue links in the final period. The width of links is proportional to the number of counties in which the connected insurers compete, i.e., thick links denote competition in many counties. In both panels nodes are laid out such that the most connected insurer (BlueCross in both panels) is placed in the center and the other insurers are placed in a surrounding circle. Panel (A) shows the change in the relationships between insurers from the initial roll-out of the federal insurance exchange market participants (37 purple-labeled nodes in Figure 4  panel (B) ). Not only are new insurers participating but there is apparently robust competition between them, demonstrated by the highly interconnected links throughout the network (Figure 4 panel (B) ); only the final few nodes have sparse connections. The weight of the links has increased as well (more counties in which insurers compete) and there is one additional significant competitor with Blue Cross VOLUME 6, 2018 beyond Coventry in Figure 4 Qualitatively, systemic competition has undergone two distinct phases: In the first phase, competition has significantly improved, from the observable improvement in insurer connectivity between panel (A) and panel (B) of Figure 4 . The number of regional insurer groups (one unique color per group in Figure 4 , determined by a random walk method [29] ) increases dramatically between the two time periods as well, doubling from 8 to 16 groups. This increase in insurance group count can be regarded as a secondary result of competition, which has led to increased specialization [31] , [32] , in this case a more regionally specialized insurance market.
For example, this territoriality effect has been observed in the competition between hospitals who are faced with regional competitors. Hospitals can benefit from providing specialized care facilities close to competitors rather than locating these facilities near their own facilities that offer their traditional services in order to avoid eroding their core services [33] . Regional specialization may also be influenced by how difficult it is for new insurers to enter a market that is heavily dominated by a single insurer since providers are more willing to negotiate their best price with insurers with the highest market share [34] .
In the second phase, that is evident by comparing panels (C) and (D), there is a clear reduction in the density of the competition network. This is the result of many insurance companies either dropping out ACA entirely or cutting back on their plans and geographic outreach, mainly because the federal ACA marketplace ended up being neither cost effective nor sustainable, especially for insurers operating in states that do not allow the so-called Medicaid expansion and those who still allowed non-Obamacare-compliant plans even after ACA went into effect [35] .
IV. ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION NETWORKS
Looking at the evolution of the competition network in Figure 4 , and the two phases of rise and fall of competition, we wonder how much the competition structure of today is similar to that of the beginning of ACA or the period immediately before that. This question cannot be answered simply by comparing the density of competition networks over time since density captures a simple count and reveals little about systemic aspects of competition that are embedded in the competition network.
One might also observe that the network in 2017 is similar to that of 2013 from the perspective of relative power of certain key players, most notably companies such as Blue Cross. However, focusing on specific companies and their relative market share over time misses those scenarios that depend on changes in the structure of competition beyond the role of individual players. Here, we hypothesize that the structure of competition has demonstrated some level of systemic resilience, meaning that even though individual players might have changed since the introduction of ACA, the key attributes of the structure of competition have returned to its original form after a period of transition.
How do we evaluate this hypothesis? One way is to introduce a distance measure based on the topology of networks and use it as a measure of changes in the competition structure. This approach has two fundamental problems: First of all it is difficult and arbitrary since the size of networks change over time and introducing distance measures for weighted graphs of arbitrary size is challenging. More importantly, in using a distance measure on the entire network topology, we capture an array of changes in the network, and not necessarily those who are directly related to the structure of competition. Alternatively, a better approach is to select a number of relevant network parameters and perform the analysis solely based on them. These parameters need to have two features: They need to capture attributes related to the entire network (e.g., average eigenvector centrality), rather than local measures (e.g., average degree centrality). Moreover, they need to be theoretically related to systemic competition and other closely related factors, such as distribution of market power and possibility of formation of oligopolies based on indirect cooperations.
Based on these criteria we choose network modularity, average eigenvector centrality and skewness of centrality distribution of the competition networks as the parameters to evaluate the evolution of the structure of competition over time. Network centrality measures are meant to capture relative status, power or market position in a complex network [36] . There are several different definitions and measures of centrality based on degree, betweenness, closeness and status of neighbors [37] . However, as [22] and [38] argue, eigenvector centrality is a more appropriate measure of power and status in the network, compared to other measures of centrality. Eigenvector centrality and its distribution have also been shown to be a proper measure of competition in markets [39] , [40] and in many complex networks where interaction among agents are driven by competition [23] . We capture both average value and skewness of centrality. The former demonstrates the average relative market power of insurance firms, while the latter captures the extent of skewness of the market power distribution. For a given average centrality value, we expect positive values of skewness to be indicators of more number of firms with higher market power, compared to a symmetric distribution. The other parameter of choice, network modularity, represents the strength of interconnection of nodes within communities compared to connections between communities. To measure the strength of the community structure, we first used the algorithm suggested in [29] to partition the network into communities of densely connected nodes, with the nodes belonging to different communities being only sparsely connected. Next, we measure weighted modularity index using the measurement of community structure Q where Q = 1 is a maximum that indicates a strong community structure [41] .
Network modularity has been shown to impact dynamics of competition and cooperation as was discussed in Section II. In a number of previous publications by Gianetto and Heydari [21] , [42] , [43] a stochastic evolutionary gametheoretic model on complex networks was used to determine which network parameters drive dynamics of collaboration and competition in complex networks where the underlying interaction among agents is driven by both competition and cooperation. There, it was demonstrated that network modularity had the highest impact on reducing competition among all tested network parameters.
Results of network analysis are shown in Figure 5 . For each of the 7 projected competition networks, we have computed the modularity, average eigenvector centrality, and the skewness of eigenvector centrality. As explained earlier, modularity and centrality levels have inverse relationship with overall competition, while the skewness of centrality has a direct relationship in this regard. Having these relationships in mind, and as evident from Figure 5 , all three measures suggest that the competition under ACA has followed a reverse U-shape, which corresponds to the two distinct phases that were described in the previous section.
To ensure that we have captured the correct network parameters and calculation method, we also tracked the evolution of several other network parameters for the same data points and verified that none of the other measures result in the clear trends of rise and fall of competition. We also analyzed the same three parameters for the non-weighted version of the same networks to see if the same trends are maintained and observed that the analysis of the non-weighted graphs gives misleading results.
What do we learn from these trends? First, the trends of these parameters show an initial rise in competition from 2013 to 2015, followed by a sharp decline since 2015, as was also suggested by Figure 4 . Moreover, if we accept that the selected parameters are indicators of systemic competition measures, our analysis show that the competition level has reached a level, close to that of the beginning of ACA. This is a significant result that cannot be demonstrated by common measures based on the average number of plans per county that are used in most of the discussions around ACA competition. However, our result agrees with what several health care experts have qualitatively argued, that ''when it comes to competition and choice, the markets may look very much the way they did before the enactment of the law'' [44] .
This result should not come as a surprise to complexity scientists. The health care system is a complex adaptive system [45] and in most complex adaptive systems [46] , there are multiple equilibriums and attractors [47] . Most systems show certain level of resilience in response to forces that push them out of equilibrium, unless the forces are strong enough to move the system to another basin of attraction [48] , [49] . Our results mean that the regulatory and incentive forces embedded in the ACA, at least from the perspective of market VOLUME 6, 2018 competition, have not been sufficient to successfully change the equilibrium of the insurance market. As a result and following a transient change in response to the external shock to the system (i.e., introduction of ACA), the competition system has gone back to its original state. One important implication of this finding is that more aggressive regulatory measures and incentive structures might be needed in future versions of health care reforms in order to create the intended competitive environment in the insurance market by moving the system out of its current equilibrium.
V. CONCLUSION
Competition is a central issue in most controversial debates regarding health care reform. It was also a key goal of the Affordable Care Act, although the general consensus is that this goal has not been achieved, at least not in a sustainable way.
In this paper, we took a deeper look into the structure and dynamic of competition in the insurance market, by analyzing the data from the start of the ACA until the latest available data in April 2017. In order to capture the structure of competition, we constructed a series of bipartite networks, with nodes representing insurers and target counties. We then created monopartite weighted networks with nodes representing insurance companies, and ties between two nodes represent the level of competition based on the number of counties insurers have in common. Based on some earlier theoretical work, we selected network modularity and eigenvector centrality as two network variables that can be used as measurable proxies to capture competition in a network structure. We demonstrated that the temporal evolution of competition since the beginning of ACA has not been uniform, rather it has experienced an inverted U-Shape, with a peak at 2015. The key network measures also show that the overall level of market competition in 2017 is back to its pre-ACA level in 2013, once the network measures are calculated for weighted networks. This is particularly interesting as it suggests an inherent resilience in the insurance market that has brought back the network state to its original form, three years after the external shock that was introduced by the ACA to the system. The methods we use here are capable of exposing the local structures of competition, by extracting and comparing networks in different geographic regions and based on different characteristics of insurance companies. For example, we expect to see different competition patterns for companies who participate only in the ACA market, compared to those who are participants in both ACA and other markets. Furthermore, exploring the evolution of competition in various geographic areas, based on their demographic profile, can reveal interesting findings. For example, a recent study shows that California and Michigan have been relatively successful in nurturing insurer competition, while Florida, North Carolina, and Texas have shown less success [50] .
One implication of this study is that more aggressive drastic regulatory measures and incentive structures might be needed in future health care reforms in order to create the intended competitive environment in the insurance market by moving the system out of its current equilibrium. Some measures such as introducing public options, especially in areas with low competition, have been proposed to enhance competition, although the impact of such measures need further studies.
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